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NAF home > Symposia and reports > Measuring excellence in research and research training
Excellence in industry-funded research
The first thing I wanted to draw your attention to, in case you hadn’t noticed it, is that we are existing in a world of constant uncertainty and constant change. As you will see in a few minutes, that has to be built in to any assessment of excellence. I will just put that into context for industry. Probably most of you know that up to, say, 15 years ago, through the ’80s, industry had very large, well-funded, interest-driven research labs. Famous ones were Bell Telephone Labs, with a number of Nobel Prize winners, the IBM labs and so on, and even within BHP at that time there were some 650-odd people. Some time in the early ’90s the bean counters, as they are called, started to ask the question, ‘What value is coming out of this?’ And that is exactly the question, I believe, that the university community is being asked now by the public, through the politicians and of course through the Public Service: ‘What value is being given to society?’ In the case of industry, the answer from the researchers was exactly the sort of arguments I have heard from other speakers this morning: ‘It is self?evident that we are adding value.’ That is a simple way of putting it. So the answer in industry was quite simple. They cut the funding. All those giant labs were torn to pieces. In the BHP case, in the second half of the ’90s we took those 650 people down to 100 or so. And then we were asked the question, ‘Well, if you want to grow, you had better show you create value.’ How do you measure value? It is quite simple in industry: it is cash. If you can put a dollar value on it, then you get somewhere. So we had to develop methods, which I will talk about in a few moments, for persuading the management that we were creating value for the company. Scientific excellence is obviously necessary if you are going to create value through technology, but it is not sufficient to say, ‘We are scientifically excellent.’ You have to show what value you are creating, in terms that the management understand. And what you heard from Robin Batterham this morning, whether you like it or not, is that he is telling you, I believe, that you are going to have to show that you are creating value for the country, using methods that the country can understand.
What we had to do was first of all to find out how the management itself valued its own activities, and then embed our technology within it. We developed within BHP – and these methods are used quite widely within industry – in our case four methods of actually putting a dollar value on what we were doing. The first one, which we called a ‘quick & dirty’ net present value calculator, is essentially analogous to the way in which you calculate your mortgage repayments, or put a slab of money in and get your pension out. It is quick and dirty. We have a slab of money within BHP for curiosity-driven research – it is a pretty generous sum – and if anybody came to me and asked for funding from that they had to bring with them a very first estimate, using that first estimator: ‘How much money is it going to make for the company?’ Quite simple. There are more complicated models. The next one is the discounted cash flow. Both of those models I believe have an analogy in what you are seeing at the moment from the government agencies where they are asking you to give citation indexes and so on – simple counters that they are trying to assess the value. What they have not done yet is turn it into dollars; however, dollars are embedded deeply in what you do. Whether you like it or not, every grant you get is given in dollars. So ultimately these measures will have to be mapped onto dollars. The two methods at the bottom of the slide, on which I will not go into any detail, of course, are basically taking into account the huge uncertainties that surround research. Is it going to work? Will it not? What are the probabilities of it? And, in the industry context, will it make money? These methods were taken directly from the financial areas of the company, and essentially we have developed methods which are a generalisation of the share option process, the share option market. We treat research as an option. I will show you that in a moment, but basically what it does is to allow you to include the huge uncertainties surrounding research, and markets, and make money from it. There are some pretty clear uncertainties that come about if you are trying to say how much money a new area of research is going to make. Supposing CSIRO is getting into titanium. (BHP started that as well and we already have a pilot plant in Australia.) In order to get the funding for that, which is very significant, we actually had to consider, among other things, all these distributions. We had to work out, ‘What is the selling price going to be? How is it going to vary over the next 40 years?’ and the production costs, construction costs and so on. Then we had to do this so-called Real Options Analysis, and by going along to the management and saying, ‘By taking into account all these things, including the probability of technical success, we believe that this project can make $100 million’ – or whatever the figure is – ‘for the company,’ we found then the management was willing to say, ‘We will fund it.’ When we said less quantitative things like, ‘It’s obviously good to have a great titanium industry. We don’t have one at the moment,’ or whatever, they just shrugged. So they fund it if you can present to them, in terms they understand, the value that in this case the company is going to make. And I repeat that I believe that what we heard from Robin Batterham this morning is basically a plea to the universities and research institutes that are government funded that they have to start thinking this way, if they want to go for more and more money. If you think about it, there is several billion a year going into universities and related institutes now – huge sums of money.
With that background, then: in industry – and I should say that the methods that are being used in BHP Billiton now have been embedded quite strongly into drug research, drug companies and so on – basically we have managed to change management’s view that R&D is not a discretionary cost to be saved when times get hard but rather an investment that can add value. If you think about it, that is exactly the same type of switch that we need to bring about in government circles when they look at universities. It is not a cost to be cut, it is an investment and it can add value. But you are going to have to use their methods of thinking to show them that. The important point in this slide that I also wanted just to mention is that the company now sees research and development as a series of ‘option plays’. If you are familiar with the share market and options in that sense, you will know that you can make money by, for example, not taking up an option – in this case, by cutting a project.
All of the projects in BHP Billiton are reviewed on a continuing basis, every six months, and very interestingly the people that come and do the reviews are not the technologists, they are the management, the people who are ultimately going to use it. At each review stage there are clear criteria established, if it is going to continue beyond the next review, and at that review you ask, ‘Has it met it?’ Having said that, I have to point out that often at those reviews the actual direction of the research will change. In other words, the findings over the previous six months or so will affect the outcomes quite strongly. So there is very clear guidance from management, from the people who have a vested interest in the outcomes. In Australia, within the university and national lab type context, I think Michael Barber has shown us that CSIRO is starting to move this way with its BHAGs, and in terms of the universities, the best we do at the moment is that page review you write to ARC every year to say what you have done – which is not really looked at very seriously. I think that will probably change also over the next few years. People are going to more closely look at the outcomes. The last point on the slide is also important. In industry you will stop a project because it is not going to add value, in terms of economic value, even though the science may be doing remarkably well. And again I think what you are seeing with the National Research Priorities is some of that thinking coming into the government areas.
This slide I think has got some lessons for us all. When I gave you the uncertainties, I picked on obvious things like the price and the cost of building the plant and all the rest of it – easily quantifiable measures. Unfortunately, we are now having to grapple in industry with associating dollar values with intangibles. And much of what Bob Graham, for example, said this morning was tied up with saying, ‘You can’t put a dollar value on intangibles.’ Well, unfortunately, at least in industry, you can put a dollar value on intangibles. Let’s look at the first one, to give you a quick example: environmental effects and the licence-to-operate issues. I am sure almost everybody in this room remembers BHP and Ok Tedi, the copper mine in New Guinea. BHP took a decision | |